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Not long after Bung Kamo died [June 21,1970], I received a letter from a friend. He 
had been enraged with the Great Leader of the Revolution, and had actively resisted 
Guided Democracy because he felt that both institutions were authoritarian, had 
ruined the Indonesian economy, had further impoverished the little man, and had given 
the Indonesian Communist Party the green light. But in the letter he told me how 
astonished he had been when, watching Bung Kamo's funeral cortege passing solemnly 
along the main streets of Jakarta, he had suddenly broken down into sobs. My friend 
did not explain why these tears poured down his cheeks. But I suspected that deep 
down he loved Bung Kamo while at the same time was bitterly disappointed by all 
that he had done wrong.
* In the summer of 2001, when newspapers, magazines, and organizations were commemorating the 
centennial of Soekarno's birth, I was encouraged by some Indonesian friends to make my own small 
contribution. Recognizing that I belonged to a very small group of Indonesianists old enough to have lived 
under Soekarno's rule and seen him in the flesh on many occasions, I decided to use my life-experience in the 
writing. The text grew and grew till it was far too long for the Indonesian media; so it was finally published 
in mini-pamphlet form, at the cheapest possible price, for sale in bus stations, street comers, local markets. 
For this opportunity, I want to thank Arief Djati and his wonderful, tiny Bamboe Roentjing Press. The 
readers I wanted to reach were not middle-class Djakarta intellectuals, but ordinary people, especially the 
young. So the text was written in a relaxed, colloquial Indonesian, spiced with some jokes and ironical 
allusions. At the request of some American friends, I have translated it into English here, not without 
difficulty. The Indonesian original had no footnotes, and I think needed none. But for younger non- 
Indonesian readers, perhaps some of the allusions are today obscure enough to require explanation. These 
are provided in two forms: if they are very short, they are included in the text in square brackets; if longer 
than that, as footnotes.
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Today, more than thirty years later, it is very likely that there is no one any more 
who is angry with Bung Kamo. The old rage has dispersed, overwhelmed and swept 
away by tidal waves of newer and still more bitter rage. But the love has never been 
extinguished, except that sometimes it has turned into idolization, as if Bung Kamo 
were a kind of god or maharaja, not merely an ordinary human being who was also 
extraordinary. As a result, some of his ideas, which were still fresh when he first 
launched them, have gradually become fossilized "teachings," believed to be immune to 
the ravages of Batara Kala [The demonic, ravenous God of Time, in wayang], In this way, 
the fate of Bung Kamo's thinking mirrors the fossilization undergone by the ideas of 
Kyai Hadji Dahlan, the pioneer of modernist Islam in Indonesia, Vladimir Lenin, 
pioneer of the Marxist world-revolution, St. Paul, pioneer of the globalization of 
Christianity, and of many others. In the face of the present enormous crisis, surely all 
kinds of fossilized thinking are extremely dangerous. But also incense-scented love.
Although Bung Kamo was not the avatar of a divinity, it must still be recognized 
that the course of his life was largely shaped by the Goddess of History, whose street- 
name is Miss Suppose-That. Suppose that Bung Kamo had been bom in 1881, not in 
1901. It would have been impossible then for him to attend a HBS,1 the very best type 
of high school in the Indies, or to be a member of the first class of graduates from 
Bandung's Institute of Technology, or even, perhaps, to become President of Indonesia 
in 1945—since by then he would have been sixty-four years old, which for an 
Indonesian in those days was very old indeed. Bom in 1901, he had the good fortune 
to become the heir of the great pioneers of liberation movements in Asia and the Near 
East. Jose Rizal, national hero and martyr of the Philippines, bom in 1861, was 
executed by the Spanish colonial regime five years before the baby Soekamo first saw 
the light of day. Sim Yat-sen, the great founding father of Chinese nationalism, was 
bom in 1866 and died two years before Bung Kamo founded his Indonesian National 
Party (PNI) in 1927. Mahatma Gandhi, bom in 1869, was a world-famous figure when 
Bung Kamo still had snot dripping from his little-boy nose. Kemal Pasha (Ataturk), 
bom in 1881, became president of the nation-state of Turkey when Bung Kamo was 
enjoying teenage life in high school. (And Bung Kamo was only four years old when 
Japan became the first Asian state to win a military victory over a European power, in 
this case imperial Russia.) Bung Kamo revered all these leaders, learned from their 
struggles, and so came to feel that Indonesia's fight for independence had to be made 
part of the fight for emancipation throughout the colonial world. Here was sown the 
"global" consciousness that later bloomed in the form of the Bandung Conference of 
Non-Aligned Nations in 1955 and his own concept of the New Emerging Forces.
Miss Suppose-That had still another role to play which ought to be mentioned here. 
"By chance" the first Marxist revolution exploded in St. Petersburg when Bung Kamo 
was still "sweet sixteen," a time of life which is usually full of idealism, dynamism, 
and romanticism. Even as an old man, Bung Karno was still fond of talking about the 
"romanticism" of revolution—a language very different from that of younger 
Indonesian Marxists like Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, and Sudisman [the top leaders of the
1 Hoogere Burgerschool. These Dutch-language high schools were originally intended only for the children 
of Dutch colonials and had standards equivalent to the best high schools in Holland. Only gradually were 
small numbers of privileged natives and peranakan Chinese permitted to attend. Soekamo was enrolled at 
the HBS in Surabaja.
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PKI, Indonesian Communist Party after 1951], who came of age when the Bolshevik 
movement of 1917 had begun to fossilize under the cruel dictatorship of Josef Stalin. In 
the 1920s, being a Marxist did not yet automatically mean being a member of any 
particular political apparatus. It simply meant being open to the inspiration of Karl 
Marx's and Vladimir Lenin's penetrating analyses of global capitalism and 
imperialism, and actively participating in practical politics. In this regard, Bung Kamo 
was absolutely not unique. To varying extents, his entire political generation was 
influenced by this Marxist vision. For them, socialism was like a sun magnificently 
emerging on the world's horizon. But "supposing that" Bung Kamo had been bom in 
1881, he would not have thought this way; and if bom in 1921, by the time he would 
have come of age "socialism" was no longer a general dream but was becoming the 
political monopoly of particular organizations.
"By chance," too, he was bom to a low-level Javanese priyayi and a young woman 
from the Island of the Gods (which had then only just passed fully into the clutches of 
Dutch imperialism [Southern Bali finally succumbed in 1906]. La that era "mixed 
children" were relatively rare among the native population, and even more so among 
the small educated minority. Other leading figures of his generation were almost all 
pure Minangkabau, unblemished Javanese, Sundanese from time out of mind, and so 
on. Perhaps only the peranakan [typically of mixed Chinese and native descent, and no 
longer familiar with any written Chinese] were then used to being "mixed," both by 
descent and by culture. One can guess that his family background allowed Bung Kamo 
to liberate himself very quickly from all kinds of narrow-minded ethnicism, and thus to 
embrace a very broad conception of nationalism. Yet it is also likely that his "mixed 
origins" also opened his eyes to the need for the healthy development of the cultures 
and autonomies of the many regions in the gigantic archipelago we call Indonesia.
One other "chance" proved no less important. It is a historical irony that the 
marriage which gave birth to Bung Kamo has today become—with the recent Marriage 
Law—if not quite an impossibility, certainly a big hassle.2 So one could say that the 
emergence of Bung Kamo into this fleeting world was possible only in a period when 
syncretism was still the norm in the Archipelago, and there were as yet no high, 
forbidding walls between different social groups. A fine indication of the depth of this 
syncretism is that the abortive Communist uprising of 1926-27 exploded in Banten and 
West Sumatra, both famous for the Islamic piety of their populations. Hence the 
syncretistic features of Bung Kamo's thinking were nothing out of the ordinary, but 
characterized most of the native cultures of Indonesia at that time.
To see just how crucial were the cultural norms of the Archipelago in that era for 
"making possible" Bung Kamo's political career, one has only to turn to the fate of 
Mahatma Gandhi and his Big Indian nationalism. Putting the matter quite crudely, one 
could say that Islam entered Big India on the sword-points of invaders from 
Afghanistan. From the thirteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century the most 
important kings and much of the ruling classes belonged to the Muslim minority, while 
the great majority of the common people remained Hindu. But British imperialism 
finally abolished the Muslim Mughal dynasty and gradually constructed a new
2 In the original Indonesian version of this essay, I used deliberately the slangy Javanese word "angel" 
rather than the standard Indonesian "sukar."
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political system based on electoral representation. Understandably these drastic 
changes angered the former ruling groups who feared losing all their privileges and 
becoming an ordinary minority. Here was the source of ever-increasing social 
antagonisms that in the end split Big India into two separate independent states, 
Smaller India and Pakistan, to the accompaniment of mass mutual slaughter between 
Muslims and Hindus. Although Gandhi was a good Hindu, he had a broad and 
humane vision, and did eveiything he could to prevent these calamities—with the 
result that he was assassinated by a fanatical terrorist who regarded the great man as 
a traitor to the Hindu community.
In Indonesia, on the other hand, Islam entered gradually, and, on the whole, 
peacefully, via individual preachers and seafaring traders. Gradually, too, the old 
Hindu-Buddhist monarchies disappeared, or converted to Islam, and the official 
institutions of the old religion vanished into the night. But in this centuries-long 
process, syncretism was always salient. Animistic and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs 
remained strong, as evidenced by the deep popularity, even today, of stories from the 
Mahabharata and the Ramayana, not only among the Javanese, but also among the 
Sundanese, Balinese, and Madurese, and even on the Malay Peninsula. The result of 
this steady syncretism was that there was no high religious wall separating rulers and 
ruled. In recruiting his armies, Prince Diponegoro could calmly utilize the symbols both 
of Islam and of Javanese mysticism, hi the nineteenth century, only the bloody Paderi 
wars3 in West Sumatra were marked by adversaries of clearly antagonistic religious 
orientations. Thus it was that Bung Kamo, at least in his salad days, could pursue his 
syncretic political vision, open to elements of all religions, without meeting the 
Mahatma's personal and political fate. To the last moment of his life, the integrity of 
the Republic of Indonesia remained firm.
Nonetheless, in the long run, the Indonesia of his youth could not escape changes 
which gradually undermined the old syncretic cultures. Social compartmentalization 
steadily increased. Both Muslim and Christian missionaries worked hard to eliminate 
everything that seemed to them "superstitious" residues from a "primitive" past. The 
rapidly expanding secular education system of the state also "cornered" and 
marginalized the older ways of seeing the world. As literacy spread, more and more 
people read printed tracts glorifying "international norms and criteria." The traditional 
kyai (learned Islamic scholars) were forced little by little to give way to journalists and 
other intellectuals espousing a modernist Islam purified of "superstition." Marxists too 
were more and more inclined to dispense with people like Hadji Misbach, Semaun, and 
Tan Malaka,4 and to follow either Moscow's or Peking's "international line." And in 
the era of Harto every Indonesian was legally compelled to adhere to a "religion with a 
Book" (i.e. internationally "standard"), while syncretic belief-systems were, so to 
speak, kicked out of the official arena.
3 Three Minangkabau pilgrims to Mecca, who happened to be in the city when it fell to the austere, 
fundamentalist Wahhabi movement at the end of the eighteenth century, became converted. On their return to 
West Sumatra in 1803 they began a three-decade long, partly successful, armed struggle to wipe out the 
syncretic Islam till then prevailing there.
4 A devout Muslim and returned pilgrim from Mecca, Misbach was a staunch communist in the 1920s; 
Semaun and Tan Malaka were the first and second natives to head the Indonesian Communist Party, and 
both were later repudiated by the party apparatus.
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Bung Kamo struggled might and main to dam the tide of de-syncretization, but not 
always in a wise manner. In reaction to Sekarmadji Kartosuwirjo's Darul Islam 
rebellion,5 the horror of the Tjikini Affair,6 the deadlock in the Constituent Assembly,7 
and the PRRI,8 Soekamo became increasingly suspicious of modernist Muslims, without 
sufficiently distinguishing between moderates and hardliners. On the other hand, he 
was fond of the Nahdlatul Ulama and its syncretistic Islam. The total ban he imposed 
on the Masyumi proved to be a rash and vain policy which had dire consequences in 
the longer run. Even in the case of the PKI, he was wary of standardization. He made 
the murdered Tan Malaka, bogeyman to Aidit's PKI, a National Hero.9 And in the last 
years of his rule, it became obvious that Bung Kamo particularly liked Njoto, whom he 
regarded as the most flexible and "syncretistic" of the PKI leaders. Rumor even had it 
that he wanted Njoto (who was then facing serious trouble inside his party10) to start a 
new Marxist (syncretic-nationalist) party in competition with the "standardized" PKI. 
Yet in the end all these endeavors collapsed in the catastrophe of 1965-66, which 
reminds us of the catastrophe experienced by Gandhi twenty years earlier.
All the same, we must also bear in mind that although Bung Kamo was a legatee of 
the old, indigenous syncretism, he was also a modem politician, with the consequence 
that in his hands syncretism took on a new form, a good deal less syncretistic than its 
forerunners. This transformation is quite plain in his justly famous colonial-era work, 
Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism. The title itself, let alone the content, shows that in his 
eyes Islam and Marxism were "boxes," in other words, walled communities. Thus 
Islam was just that, Islam, without any local variations, Marxism was also just that, 
Marxism without local variation. The compartmentalism of these "boxes," he thought, 
had to be "overcome" in a highly conscious and sober-minded manner: thus a 
"planned," rather than a natural syncretism. The instrument at hand for the task of 
"overcoming" was to be a broad and deep nationalism. Marhaenism—I suspect that it 
was no accident that the term almost rhymed with Marxism—was always described 
by him as Marxism adapted to Indonesia's unique conditions. These ideas were 
launched at the "perfect time." The PKI was in ruins after its failed rebellion against
5 Calling for Indonesia to become an Islamic state, this rebellion, centered in West Java and the western 
fringe of Central Java, lasted from 1948 to 1963.
6 Tjikini Affair: a deadly grenade attack on Soekamo on November 30,1957 while he was visiting his 
children's school in the Tjikini neighborhood of Jakarta. The President himself escaped unharmed, but 
eleven people, mostly school children died, and thirty others were seriously wounded. Later, a group of 
Islamic radicals, mostly from Bima on the island of Sumbawa, were tried and convicted for the outrage.
7 Elected in 1955, the Assembly was supposed to draw up a permanent new constitution for Indonesia, but 
its work was paralyzed by conflicts between the major Islamic parties and the National Party, the 
Communist Party, and the various Christian minority parties.
8 PRRI: the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia, proclaimed in West Sumatra in 
February 1958 in opposition to the central government in Jakarta. The leaders were a loose coalition of 
ambitious, discontented military officers, both Muslim and Protestant, individual leaders from the anti­
communist Masyumi (modernist Islamic) and Socialist parties, and regional notables.
9 Tan Malaka was executed by elements in the East Java military in February 1949, while he was 
attempting to rally the nation in the wake of the Dutch military's capture of Soekarno and Hatta.
10 It is credibly reported that Njoto had become entangled with a Russian girl and was planning to divorce 
his wife.
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the colonial state; and the once-mighty Sarekat Islam (Islamic League) was in its death 
throes, to be replaced by a welter of smaller, often rivalrous, Muslim organizations.
In this grand endeavor, Bung Kamo was lucky enough to get a windfall from Miss 
Suppose-That. In the 1930s President Manuel Quezon of the Philippines bemoaned the 
fact that 150 kilometers north of Manila, he needed an interpreter to talk to the local 
Ilocano-speaking voters. When he came to power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung's radio 
speeches could not be understood by the majority of the Chinese people, because he 
used Mandarin (the language of Peking and its environs) with a thick Hunan accent. 
Mahatma Gandhi had exactly the same experience. But in the Dutch East Indies, things 
were very different. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centimes, the VOC was too 
stingy, and in the nineteenth century The Netherlands was too poor, too small, and too 
unimportant, to impose the Dutch language on the Archipelago, in the way that English 
was imposed on Big India, and French on Senegal and the Ivory Coast. For these 
reasons, from early on the colonialists used a pidginized Malay as the administrative 
language throughout the areas they controlled. At the end of the nineteenth century this 
pidgin was increasingly standardized to fit the needs of modem schooling for the 
natives. Meanwhile, a kind of bazaar Malay was developing speedily in the world of 
the press, pioneered by Eurasians and pemnakan Chinese (who were the true pioneers 
of modem Indonesian literature). Although there were also newspapers and magazines 
which used various regional languages, including Javanese, by the time Bung Kamo 
graduated from his HBS high school, Malay was coming out decisively on top both 
within the bureaucratic apparatus and in the open market. Still better, and even more 
"by chance," this victorious language was not the personal property of any major 
ethnic group in the Archipelago. Hence it was very easy for it to become the National 
Language (that is, if the role of Grandfather VOC could be forgotten). "By chance" 
again, among Bung Kamo's many talents none was more characteristic than his gift for 
oratory. Thus he endeavored with all his powers to take advantage of this windfall 
from the Goddess of History to spread the national language in every direction of the 
compass; and, simultaneously, with alluring, exciting, humorous, and heart-rending 
words, to invite the natives to transform themselves and their consciousness and thus 
to become members of the new Indonesian nation. With his resonant sweet voice Bung 
Kamo demonstrated his love for his fellow-Indonesians (not for the natural resources 
of their respective ancestral lands), and also asked them to love him as their leader 
and the spokesman of their aspirations. Since this voice could be heard even by the 
illiterate majority of the natives, national solidarity grew ever wider and stronger. One 
might therefore say that Bung Kamo was the perfect leader for the age of radio.
During the two decades between what white people11 like to call The First and The 
Second World War, it became very evident that in South and Southeast Asia there was 
a critical difference between the policies of the English-speaking imperialists and those 
of the users of French and Dutch. In Uncle Sam's Philippines, a cacique democracy, run 
by oligarchs on the basis of an electoral system with a highly restricted suffrage, began 
to be established as early as the 1900s. By the 1930s there was already an (Eurasian) 
president, and independence was promised for 1945. In Big India—which till the
111 used the jocular, slangy term "bule" here. It is a curious experience for me to find this word, which 
literally means "albino," now so widely used for "white people" that everyone assumes it is old. I remember 
inventing it on a trip to Central Java in 1963, to my Indonesian companions' half-shocked amusement.
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middle 1930s included Burma—elections were already institutionalized and the seeds 
of democracy quite widely sown. After Burma was separated from Big India in 1937, 
three successive natives became Prime Minister before the country was invaded by the 
armies of Hirohito. Although London had made as yet no promises of independence, a 
trend in that direction was quite apparent. On the other hand, in The Netherlands 
Indies and in French Indochina there were no meaningful elections, and both had 
become police states, in which eventual independence was the last thing on the colonial 
rulers' minds. As a result both zones became fertile fields for the idea of "revolution," 
and for political activity both outside colonial law and also underground.
Now "suppose that" Dutch policy had been different, or that the British had 
colonized the Archipelago, what sort of ideas would Bung Kamo have had, and what 
kind of political career would he have pursued? It is difficult to believe that he would 
not have felt compelled to participate in general elections, to become a member of the 
legislature, and very likely eventually Prime Minister—like U Saw in Burma. Even if 
this meant temporarily being under the supervision of the Governor-General. This 
supposition is strengthened by his role under the Japanese, which was not significantly 
different from that of Jose Laurel, Sr. and of Dr. Ba Maw.12 But of course the Dutch 
were . . .  Dutch! Quite possibly for just that reason throughout his long life Bung Kamo 
never participated directly or personally in any general election, where he would have 
had to compete with other native leaders for the people's votes.
In March 1942, the Japanese onslaught destroyed Dutch imperialism in a matter of 
weeks. Three and a half years later the Japanese imperialists surrendered abruptly and 
unconditionally after American atomic bombs were dropped on the ill-fated cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Dutch, who had finally been liberated from Nazi 
occupation only a few months earlier, were in no condition to make an immediate 
return to their thrones in the Archipelago—making possible the outbreak of the historic 
Indonesian Revolution. Here began the gradual process that allowed Bung Kamo to 
imagine himself as the Great Leader of the Revolution. But this imagining would have 
been out of the question without the brave struggle of the Indonesian people—and also 
without the stunning "accidents" of March 1942 and August 1945.
In this regard, the attitudes and policies of Bung Kamo during the Revolution are of 
the greatest interest. As is well known, all the cabinets formed between 1945 and 
1949—whether led by the socialist-Marxist group or the modernist Muslims and the 
PNI—took the path of "diplomacy" vis-a-vis the Dutch, even though this path was 
strenuously opposed by all groups who happened to be out of power at any one time. 
And President Soekamo? He managed to work cooperatively with almost all groups, 
and consistently supported the policy of "diplomacy." If we read his speeches from 
the Revolutionary-era newspapers and magazines—almost none of which were later 
included in Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi (Under the Banner of the Revolution) [The official, 
bowdlerized compilation of his major texts, published late in his presidential career]—we can 
see clearly that aside from rousing Indonesian nationalism, he actually worked hard to 
calm the turbulence of the masses below—the strikers, the social revolutionaries, the 
"hard-line" or "obstinate" popular militias, and so forth. Indeed, at the time of the
12 In 1943 these seasoned politicians were appointed by Tokyo as heads of the nominally independent states 
of the Philippines and Burma. Had the war lasted through 1946, Soekamo would surely have assumed some 
comparable position.
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Madiun Affair13 he strongly condemned the New PKI created by Muso, which was far 
to the left of the previous left-wing of Amir Sjarifuddin, Setiadjit, Maruto Darusman, 
and Co., and wholeheartedly supported the policy of the Hatta Cabinet and General 
Nasution to destroy it. After the transfer of sovereignty at the end of 1949, he never, so 
far as I know, expressed any public regret for the execution of the Republic's second 
Prime Minister [Amir Sjarifuddin, who held this office from early July 1947 to late January 
1948] and his friends. Yet Bung Kamo was well-known to dislike killing and other 
forms of violence.
One can readily see, from the above description of Bung Kamo's record during the 
Revolution, how close his views were to the general outlook of the moderate nationalist 
leaders. These leaders were certain that the revolutionary military were incapable of 
decisively defeating the Dutch armed forces on the battlefield. And if this was true for 
Java and Sumatra, how much truer was it of "East Indonesia?" Therefore Indonesia 
could only achieve independence via diplomacy (of course with the TNI and the 
revolutionary militias as a strong card in the diplomats' hand). They also wanted 
Independent Indonesia to be the sole and complete legatee of the Dutch Indies, from 
Sabang to Merauke, not just Sumatra-Java-Bali. And what of "East Indonesia"? It 
should also borne in mind that in those days very few of the national-level leaders had 
any direct acquaintance with this vast and heterogeneous region. Prior to 1949, Bung 
Kamo had of course been exiled by the colonial government to Flores, but he had never 
been to Kalimantan, Timor, Sulawesi, Maluku, or Lombok. Hatta and Sjahrir 
[respectively the infant Republic's first Vice-President and Prime Minister] had been 
detained on the remote island of Banda and in Tanah Tinggi in West New 
Guinea/Papua, but otherwise their "social acquaintance" was just as narrow as Bung 
Kamo's.14 They could not be sure how strongly Indonesian nationalism had really 
rooted itself in East Indonesia—except in South Sulawesi, where Buginese and 
Makassarese took up arms against the reimposed colonial regime, and suffered huge 
casualties at the hands of Westerling.15 Thus: if there was no chance that the Dutch 
could be expelled from East Indonesia, and if East Indonesia had to be part of the 
sovereign state of the Republic of Indonesia, there was no choice but to negotiate. This 
stance of Bung Kamo's demonstrates his political realism alongside the famous 
romanticism of his rhetoric. (One reason why the Irian Barat/Papua Barat/West New 
Guinea issue was so important for him after 1950 was that he felt that in this regard 
the policy of diplomacy had failed, thanks to the sly maneuvers of the Dutch and 
certain groups in Washington.)16
13 The so-called Communist rebellion of September 1948 against the Republican government in Jogjakarta. 
On the left, the affair is remembered as the Madiun Provocation.
14 Here I used the teenage slang term "kuper," short for "kurang pergaulan" referring to a kid who doesn't 
get around much.
15 The half-Turkish Westerling, a paratrooper famous for his brutalities, killed thousands of people in early 
1946 in order to stamp out local resistance.
16 As a result of American pressure, West Papua was "temporarily" excluded from the overall agreement on 
the transfer of sovereignty over the Netherlands Indies to the government of Indonesia, produced by the 
Round Table Conference in The Hague at the end of 1949. The agreement stated that the status of West 
Papua would be settled within a year through bilateral negotiations between The Hague and Jakarta. But 
the Dutch reneged on this arrangement, arousing great anger in Indonesia throughout the 1950s.
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Another key factor in the thinking of Bung Kamo and the other nationalist leaders 
was the emergence of the United States after World War n as the strongest and richest 
power on "this earth of mankind." Until Chairman Mao's final victory in 1949, there 
was no power in Asia that could be regarded as a serious competitor. This American 
dominance was especially relevant for an archipelagic state like Indonesia, through and 
around which the American navy and air force could roam at will. The Soviet Union 
was far weaker than the US, and lay many thousands of miles away. Logically, then, 
Indonesia had to seek Washington's support, not its enmity. It is very plausible that 
these considerations played a key role in Bung Kamo's backing the policy of destroying 
the New PKI of Muso, who seemed to have suddenly popped up in Indonesia as the 
envoy of Moscow.17
In this context, it is instructive to compare Bung Kamo with one other outstanding 
Southeast Asian nationalist leader, who proclaimed his country's independence almost 
simultaneously with the Proclamation of August 17, 1945 at 56 Pegangsaan Timur 
Street in Jakarta. A veteran revolutionary, as well as a patriot, Uncle Ho attempted to 
carry out both a war for independence and an internal social revolution. Sure that this 
combination of policies would face the hostility of capitalist America, he ended up 
affiliating himself with the Soviet Union and Mao's China. His social revolution went 
ahead, but his nation and his state split into two, and could only be reunited thirty-one 
years later—after his own death, and after colossal sacrifices by the Vietnamese 
people that still arouse our sense of horror and admiration.
In 1950-51 Bung Kamo was already fifty years old. Perhaps that year marked the 
real apogee of his political career. He was revered and loved as an open-minded, 
prudent leader and a fighter for his people from his early youth. Seven years later he 
was almost killed in the barbarous Tjikini Affair—by a small gang of his own people. 
There followed many other attempts to assassinate him, and he was finally toppled 
from office and power by another small gang of his own people. It seems that by the 
end of the 1950s he had begun to be hated. Why?
Alas, human beings, as they grow old, are usually fated to run out of new ideas 
and to lose freshness and flexibility in their thinking. Bung Kamo was no exception. 
Over the last ten years of his rule, he created many "new" slogans and "new" 
concepts. Yet almost all of them can be said to be mere reformulations of his youthful 
thinking. His speeches were still embellished with quotations from the writings of 
internationally famous political leaders and intellectuals, but all of these quotations 
can be found in his speeches and writings of the late 1920s and 1930s. It looks as if 
Bung Kamo no longer had time—and perhaps even interest—in reading. Did he ever 
dip into the novels and short stories of Pramoedya Ananta Toer, or the poetry of 
Chairil Anwar? Meanwhile, the world and men's ways of thinking continued 
remorselessly to change.
17 The veteran communist Muso, who had lived in the Soviet Union since 1935, flew to Indonesia from 
Communist-controlled Czechoslovakia in disguise, and dramatically revealed his identity on August 11, 
1948. He harshly criticized the policies of the existing left-wing parties and pushed through their pell-mell 
merger into a New PKI with a new radical Program that he called the Djalan Baru, or New Path. How far he 
was really an emissary of Stalin remains a matter of controversy.
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One can surmise that gradually he was "swallowed" up by his own office. In 
Lukisan Revolusi, the historic photographic record of the revolutionary years, there are 
many touching pictures of Bung Kamo. He is always neatly dressed, but his clothes are 
quite simple and not far removed from those of the cabinet ministers—some of whom 
still wore shorts to work. At that time he really was the leader of the revolution for 
independence. How remote those old pictures are from the public figure of Bung Kamo 
under Guided Democracy! In that era, he usually appeared in a super-elegant quasi­
military uniform, with a dozen ribbons on his chest, and huge dark glasses—even at 
night. So he became an easy target for malicious foreign cartoonists who made him look 
like just another reactionary, coup-prone Latin American general. Rather like 
"Marshal" Tito, and miles away from Uncle Ho. By this time, Bung Kamo had become 
Great Leader of the Revolution.
When he became President—an office without precedent in Indonesia's history, and 
without any strong traditions as to the scope of its authority—Bung Kamo had little 
real experience to prepare him for the job. He had absolutely no administrative 
background. He had never been a member of a legislative body. Even with regard to 
membership in political organizations, such as parties, labor unions, or revolutionary 
militias, his experience had been fleeting. Possibly he had neither talent for, nor interest 
in, such activities, which in the modem world are usually the political background for a 
country's president. For all these reasons, in Indonesia the presidential office has never 
had clear-cut functions and limits accepted by all citizens. All the more so because of 
the wretched Constitution of 1945, hastily drawn up under the watchful eyes of the 
Japanese military dictatorship, and in significant respects modeled on the constitution 
of China under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. All these factors opened the door for 
a syncretism that over time grew more and more dangerous. The function of Head of 
State— on the level of, say, Elizabeth II—was only too easily jumbled up with the role 
of national leader—on the level of, say Winston Churchill or Mahathir bin Muhamad. 
Accordingly authority was confused with power, and over the long haul, the latter 
superseded the former. What was prohibited to a Head of State was perfectly all right 
for the Father of the Nation.
In the last years of his rule, one could sense that the subterranean influence of 
Javanese kingly traditions was steadily growing. This was not just a matter of the 
multiplication of ostentatiously pompous state ceremonies. In former times, a king was 
regarded as a unique figure who had personally received the wahju [a ball of mysterious 
light said to descend on the head of a man destined to be king] from God or Gods; in no 
way was he merely primus inter pares. And if the wahju stayed with him, the king 
would automatically become king-for-life. During the Revolution, Bung Kamo was still 
loved as primus inter pares. But afterwards, over time, most of the comrades-in-arms 
of his generation were marginalized or marginalized themselves. In the end, alas, he 
was willing to be appointed—by a Provisional MPR whose members he had appointed 
himself—as President-for-Life: one hundred percent outside the Constitution of 1945. 
Perhaps it was as early as this juncture that the knell sounded for his time of triumphs: 
a president-for-life can only be removed by the Angel Gabriel18 or by human violence.
18 An allusion to Djibril, the Angel of Death, central to Pramoedya Anana Toer's bitter short story "My 
Kampung" in the collection Tales from Djakarta.
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Two small but significant events demonstrate in exemplary fashion the problems 
that arise when Head of State, Leader of the Nation, and Maharaja are fused together. 
The first: Believing themselves to be part of the movement for the emancipation of the 
human race, the nationalist leaders of Bung Kamo's generation generally respected (at 
least in public) the principle of monogamy, not least in order to raise the status and 
protect the rights of women. The same principle operated for the majority of Islamic 
political leaders. One can imagine that if in the 1930s a political activist heard 
someone predict that eventually Bung Kamo would have four wives, he would have 
felt deeply offended. But after he became President, Bung Kamo violated this old norm 
and became the first top-level leader to practice polygamy. Of course it is hue that 
Islamic traditions permit a man to take four wives, but Bung Kamo was not a pious 
Muslim, and in the eyes of ordinary people his multiple marriages were more 
associated with the Javanese royal tradition of taking unlimited numbers of wives and 
concubines. Some people condemned him, some smirked, and others simply shrugged 
their shoulders. The second comes from my personal experience: In 1963, for various 
reasons including a failed harvest, famine was spreading in Central Java. I often saw 
corpses and people more dead than alive sprawled on the sidewalks of cities and 
towns. Bung Kamo's response to this catastrophe was to give a speech inviting hungry 
people to eat field-mice— "delicious" and "full of vitamins." This invitation was 
received with widespread cynicism. Not a single person believed that field-mice were a 
regular feature of the menu at the presidential palace. I was then reminded of the 
alleged exclamation of Queen Marie Antoinette on the eve of the explosion of the 
French Revolution. When she got word that the common people were suffering terribly 
because the price of bread had soared beyond their means to buy it, the Queen, with 
the naivete typical of protected aristocratic ladies, exclaimed: "Lho, in that case, why 
don't they eat kue lapis?" [kue lapis: a gooey sweetmeat made of layers o f flavored sticky rice, 
usually produced for special celebrations] One had the impression that Bung Kamo, 
"protected" by the Tjakrabirawa Regiment (Presidential Security Guard) was by then 
far, far removed from the daily lives of the poor.
And Bung Kamo's nationalism? I imagine no one will deny that Bung Kamo's 
nationalism was deep, strong, and fiery. Yet even nationalism cannot escape the God 
of Time and the ceaseless change of human history. When Bung Kamo was young, most 
of the population of the Archipelago still lived in their traditional villages and 
kampongs. No fewer were still illiterate and were raised within local oral traditions. It 
would have been rare for a man from East Kalimantan to have an Atjehnese friend, let 
alone to marry his friend's sister. Hence one of the main goals of the nationalist 
"missionaries" of the period was to make people aware—from Sabang to 
Merauke—that they were all, together, "Indonesians." Without this awareness, and the 
broad nationalist movement that developed out of it, there was no possibility of 
smashing Dutch colonialism once and for all; the dozens of local uprisings that had 
occurred between 1825-1910 had all been destroyed by Dutch military forces (into 
which sizeable numbers of natives were always recruited). Without this awareness, the 
colonial bureaucracy (whose membership in the 1930s was 90 percent native) would 
remain solidly loyal to the colonial master. Bung Kamo understood all this very well, 
and fought with might and main to spread national awareness, based on the idea of 
national unity. Those who were "aware" would be able to rise above all the prejudices 
and narrow-mindednesses passed down from their ancestors. Batak were, yes,
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Indonesians; Hindu Balinese were, yes, Indonesians; followers of Kaharingan beliefs 
[i.e. the "animist" Dayak of Kalimantan] were, yes, Indonesians; Chinese were, yes, 
Indonesians; and the same would have to apply even to the proud Javanese. It should 
be stressed here that this kind of nationalism involved a commitment to action, not 
merely a new identity. For example, precisely because Protestant Batak and Muslim 
Minangkabau were very different, and in the past had occasionally been open enemies, 
"now" a young Minangkabau nationalist had to commit himself to treating Protestant 
Batak just as he would a fellow Muslim Minangkabau. The same would go for a young 
Batak nationalist. In fact, the struggle of Bung Kamo and his generation was 
astoundingly successful. Because it smelled too strongly of Java, Budi Utomo gradually 
faded away. Jong Java, Jong Ambon, Jong Islamieten Bond (which could also be called 
Jong Minangkabau) (Young Java, Young Ambon, Young Muslim League) all either 
vanished or merged into Young Indonesia (Indonesia Muda). Ethnic political 
organizations never throve under the Red-White-and-Blue (Dutch) flag.
But what happened after Indonesia joined the UN and Dutch imperialism was 
finally kaput19? With the burden and threat of Dutch dominance gone, Indonesians 
were finally in a position to manage their collective affairs and to face each other at all 
levels of society. If we may borrow a famous expression of Bung Hatta, alongside 
persatuan (unity) there now appeared persatean (perhaps, disunity, fragmentation).20 It 
goes without saying that this problem did not escape Bung Kamo's attention, all the 
more so in that the young nation-state immediately experienced a series of regional 
rebellions, almost all of which were led by people who had earlier been active in the 
nationalist movement and/or the Revolution.
The methods adopted by Bung Karno to overcome these post-independence 
difficulties are of great interest. In my judgment at least, his decisions were more based 
on his own earlier experiences and his interpretation of his own multiple roles than on 
any deep, serious reflection concerning the new situation. For simplicity's sake these 
methods can be divided into three categories.
The first was to stress the need for an old-style "national-unity" nationalism in the 
face of external threats: the Dutch, the British, the Americans, and, on a lesser scale, 
the Malaysians. One can't deny the reality of these threats—within specific limits and 
in specific instances. But denouncing the Darul Islam and the Republic of the South 
Moluccas as "merely" puppets of the Dutch, or the PRRI-Permesta as "merely" 
puppets of the UK and the USA meant closing the eyes to the concrete dissatisfactions 
of large numbers of Indonesians with the policies of their government. Joining an armed 
rebellion is not a decision lightly taken—the risks involved are substantial. And if some 
of these rebels received arms and training from foreigners, the same could be said of the 
Center. In fact, thousands of officers from the army, the navy, the air force, and the 
police were trained overseas, and almost all their weaponry came from America or the 
Soviet Union. Rashly denouncing one's political adversaries as "traitors" and 
"puppets" does not only make a good resolution of conflicts much harder, but also, in
19 The best I can do for the street slang "kapok."
211 The expression persatean comes from sate, the local form of shish kebab, separate chunks of meat 
skewered together.
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fact, diminishes the stretch of nationalism itself. By this time, alas, not all Indonesians 
were "real" Indonesians any more. Persatean, in fact.
The second and third were actually tied together in a subterranean fashion. During 
the 1950s, at least until the Tjikini Affair, Bung Kamo was very diligent about visiting 
parts of his country that he had never seen before with his own eyes. In this way he 
experienced directly the enormous heterogeneity of his people. He was also fully aware 
that in this vast country there was no "majority"—in terms of ethnicity, ideology, 
mother-tongue, or religious commitment. (The results of the free election of 1955 proved 
this perfectly.) Hence there arose any extremely complex, but very concrete problem. 
How was Bhinneka (Diversity) to be reconciled with Eka (Unity) without the two 
gravely wounding each other?
Realistic logic, as well as developments in other large and heterogeneous states, 
should have persuaded Bung Kamo that Independent Indonesia would work best as a 
federal state. The USA had been such from the moment of its birth; Brazil, after the 
abolition of its monarchy towards the end of the nineteenth century; Nigeria after die 
horrors of the Biafra War; Germany in the Weimar era and after the fall of Hitler; 
Smaller India (which was still gigantic) after gaining independence; Yugoslavia, while 
its fat and cunning "Marshal" remained in power. Had Bung Kamo survived up to the 
present, he would have seen Spain becoming a federal state, Russia too within obvious 
limits. Srilanka seems headed in the same direction. Even France, famous for its 
centralizing traditions, is being slowly forced to create space for an autonomous 
Corsica. Only in China has federalism been completely rejected, with the consequence 
that the problems of Tibet, Sinkiang, and Taiwan are getting steadily "worse" and 
more difficult to solve in a good manner.
There are different types of federalism. The components of a federal state can be 
organized on the basis of administrative traditions, ignoring ethnicity and/or religion.
America is a perfect example of this type. From this standpoint Arizona 
corresponds nicely with West Nusa Tenggara and Texas with East Sumatra [These are 
"administrative" provinces covering many different ethnic and religious groups]. They can 
also be organized on the basis of concentrated ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, 
as in Nigeria (the Indonesian parallels would be Atjeh and Bali, for instance). They can 
even be organized on the basis of a mixture of the above, as in Smaller India. The nice 
thing about a federal system is that internal political conflicts, which can sometimes be 
very heated, need not always be "settled" at the national level with an absolute victory 
for one side over another. A federal system can thus help to mitigate antagonisms, 
anxieties, and an atmosphere of "it's them or us." Since the bloody Partition of 
1947-48, India has been quite stable: no coups d'etat and very few dangerous 
rebellions. For years Communists have governed Kerala and Bengal, while semi-fascists 
have dominated in Bombay; every major ethnic group has a state of its own, with 
significant autonomy in running its own affairs. India's federal system took root under 
the world-class statesman Jawaharlal Nehru, who also actively led the huge Congress 
Party incorporating many different interests. A powerful civil bureaucracy inherited 
from British imperialism has also proved a strong stabilizing factor.
And Bung Kamo? He rejected any form of federalism and actively participated in 
the destruction of the Federal Republic of Indonesia established by the Round Table
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Conference in The Hague. Of course, he had good reasons (short term). Between 1946 
and 1949 the Dutch had set up many federal states (mostly headed by local feudal 
rulers or other collaborators) in order to provide a balance against the Republic of 
Jogjakarta, and, if possible, to destroy it. This is reason why the sound of the word 
"federalism" rang false in the ears of many Indonesians, and most national-level 
leaders were profoundly allergic to it. A pity, in fact.
I mentioned earlier that most of the rebellions of the 1950s were led by people who 
had earlier been active in the nationalist movement and/or the Revolution. None of 
these was separatist. (The one exception was the abortive Republic of the South 
Moluccas, and its leaders were mostly former collaborators.) "Supposing that" a 
reasonable and healthy federal system had been sincerely set up, it is very likely that 
many of these rebellions would not have happened. One could imagine further: the PKI 
governing the state of Central Java, Masyumi ruling the state of West Sumatra, 
Parkindo [the Protestant Party] in power in North Tapanuli, the Nahdlatul Ulama 
managing the state of East Java-Madura, the Catholic Party running Flores, the PNI 
Bali, and even an Atjeh Party in control of Atjeh. In this manner each party would 
have the chance to learn how to govern well and thereby show nearby states how their 
residents might fare if such parties were electorally successful there. Of course for such 
a federal system to work, genuinely free and competitive elections would have to be 
held every three or four years, and the autonomy of the federal states would have to be 
fully guaranteed in the constitution. In addition, it would probably have been a good 
idea—if Eka were to be evenly balanced with Bhinneka—to form a huge, diverse party, 
along the lines of the Congress Party, led directly by the Father of the Country. Had 
Bung Kamo been prepared to lead the PNI in person and to "go down"21 to participate 
directly in the 1955 elections, it is more than likely that he would have won a majority. 
(Even his daughter later managed to win one third of the national vote!) But Bung 
Kamo decided otherwise. Although he supported and manipulated the PNI 
(Indonesian National Party, representing secular nationalism of the middle-class 
variety) from behind the scenes, he did not want to be tightly bound to any 
organization or institution. He aimed to be the great leader of the entire Indonesian 
people, not merely of a majority of them. But this was just a dream, as the Goddess of 
History would demonstrate only too soon. From a certain angle it could properly be 
said that in this way Bung Kamo evaded part of his responsibility as a great leader.
But—and here is the third method—Bung Kamo worked in his own way to ensure 
that some of the useful functions of a federal system (e.g. protecting small minorities) 
were performed. Himself without racial prejudices, he tried to make sure that 
Indonesians of Chinese descent had appropriate representation in all civil political 
institutions right up to the cabinet level. He gave his blessing to, and defended, 
Baperki, which wanted to have Sino-Indonesians accepted as another among all the 
different Indonesian ethnic groups. He protected and gave opportunities to the 
religious minorities too: the adherents of Balinese-style Hinduism, Catholicism, 
Protestantism, and mysticisms and animisms of different kinds. But exactly there lay
21 Here I used the acronym turba, which encapsulates turun and bawah. The allusion is to one famous slogan 
of the late Soekamo period, borrowed directly from Maoist lingo. "Going down" meant that students and 
party elites ought to spend time working with poor peasants to understand their problems and help them 
solve them, as well as to cleanse themselves of big city pretensions and life-styles.
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the difficulty. These groups had to be protected; they had no permanent rights of their 
own. They were dependent on His Excellency, just as the peasant "little people" had 
once been dependent on wise Sultans. What all fids boiled down to was: these groups 
were not protected by the law or by the constitution, but only by the person of Bung 
Kamo, who one day would be summoned by his Maker. After he was gone, who or 
what would protect them then?
Why did he operate this way? Many factors surely played a role, including his 
allergy to federalism and his fusion of the role of head-of-state + great leader + 
maharaja.
But probably most fundamental of all was that he had become the victim of his 
own proud past. After Indonesia became independent, she needed new forms of 
leadership and a new style of nationalism. Most likely it was precisely his past 
successes that led Bung Kamo to forget this lesson.
The same pattern can be seen in Bung Kamo's attitude toward "revolution." Under 
the conditions of Dutch colonialism, and with Lenin's dictum to hand that the colonies 
were the weak link in the global imperialist system, it was natural to understand the 
concept of "revolution" as the uniting of the entire people to destroy Dutch colonialism 
within the framework of the emancipation of all the peoples of Asia and Africa, 
indeed of the whole world. It was for this reason that in 1950, after the transfer of 
sovereignty, Bung Hatta stated that "the [national] revolution is over." (Not only in 
Indonesia: by the mid-1970s virtually all the weak-link colonies in the world had 
become members of the United Nations). But Bung Kamo would not accept this. He 
was very proud of the Indonesian Revolution and had no wish to see "revolution" 
honorably buried as one now-completed task-era in Indonesia's history .
So? The Leninist legacy of his youth impelled him to continue contributing to the 
global movement of emancipation: but without a firm and steady compass to guide 
him. For a time he was among the preeminent leaders of the "neutral and independent" 
bloc between the American bloc and that of the Soviet Union and China: thus "in- 
between" the revolutionary states and the counterrevolutionary states. In colonial 
times, his comrades in this bloc had all been courageous people. But after 
independence? Nasser and Nkrumah created dictatorships built on lunatic cults of 
personality, terrorized their competitors, and finally died in despair, with their former 
reputations in ruins. U Nu also built a personality cult around himself, tore the 
Burmese economy and democratic political system to shreds, and was eventually 
overthrown by the military. And even though "Marshal" Tito was the one leader in the 
group who had really been a revolutionary activist in the classical sense, the impending 
failure of his regime was also perceptible before he died.
Subsequently, Bung Kamo launched the concepts of the New Emerging Forces 
(Nefos) fighting the Old Established Forces (Oldefos) and the Pyongyang-Peking- 
Hanoi-Phnom Penh-Jakarta axis. The first was clearly "Lenin's grandchild," but since 
the world had vastly changed since the 1920s, no one paid it much attention. The 
second had nothing to do with Lenin, and showed that the global world of Bung Kamo 
had shrunk down to East and Southeast Asia. Again, without any substantial results 
in practice. A Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere without Japan? Feeling, quite 
rightly, that he was an international figure, Bung Kamo convinced himself, quite
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wrongly, that Indonesia could become a major "revolutionary" player in the 
international arena. But in the face of giants like Japan, China, the European 
Community, the US and the Soviet Union—as opposed to tiny Holland—Indonesia, 
with its impoverished people and a state dependent on foreign countries for most of its 
arms, was effectively impotent. Meantime, Jose Ramos-Horta and his comrades in East 
Timor, who expected Bung Kamo's help in creating an independent state freed from 
the clutches of Antonio Salazar's clerico-fascist state, found themselves ignored.
And domestic revolution? At bottom, this was an idea rather difficult for Bung 
Kamo to deal with. This kind of revolution never happens without much blood being 
spilled between members of the same nation, because it means the overthrow of the 
ruling class by the classes below, and struggles for that purpose are always violently 
resisted. The total number of people who perished violently in the Great English 
Revolution of the seventeenth century, the Great French Revolution of the eighteenth 
century, and the Great Revolutions in Old Russia and China in the twentieth century is 
incalculable. Civil war of this kind, one suspects, was in sharp contradiction to Bung 
Kamo's syncretic nationalism, to say nothing of his humanity.
At the same time, it would not be fair to say that Bung Kamo did nothing to 
transform the social-economic structures inherited from the colonial period. Yet, 
generally speaking, all of his endeavors failed, partly because of his own imprudence, 
and some even boomeranged against him. The nationalization of all Dutch enterprises 
at the end of 1957—when Indonesia was already under martial law—was not only 
carried out hastily and without adequate planning, but resulted in all the most 
advanced sectors of the Indonesian economy falling willy-nilly into the hands of the 
army. Thereafter, the trade unions in these advanced sectors were paralyzed by the 
new bosses, and the enterprises themselves were typically so mismanaged that their 
productivity fell like a stone thrown into a well, to say nothing of the quiet looting of 
their assets by crooked officers. Indonesia's economic disaster in the 1960s actually 
began in December 1957. "Supposing that" the nationalizations had been carried out 
gradually and in a well-planned way during the liberal democratic period, would their 
consequences have been so tragic?
The Agrarian and Crop-sharing Laws of 1960-61 had the excellent goals of 
eliminating big landlords, distributing land to rural laborers, and enforcing a fair 
division of harvests between tenants and landowners. But crucial exceptions were 
made for: 1.) the very extensive tanah lungguh (appanage land) attached to village 
headmanship from feudal times; and 2.) land owned by religious institutions. Plenty of 
people owning acreage above the new legal limit transferred the excess land to religious 
bodies (on the boards of which they often sat). The unanticipated result was that in 
the grave agricultural crisis of the early 1960s, the identification of big landownership 
with religious institutions (Islamic, Christian, and Hindu-Balinese) grew perilously 
strong. The national leadership also failed to consider the timing of the new laws. By 
then inflation was beginning to soar out of control, and the value of the rupiah fell 
week by week. People no longer had any confidence in the currency and hurried to get 
hold of concrete "goods," including land, instead. This behavior was particularly rife 
among bureaucrats who felt that their fixed, monetary salaries had lost most of their 
value. Especially officials in the ministries of the interior and of agrarian affairs, as 
well in the public prosecution, the police and the army, moved quietly to expand the
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acreage they owned and to block any serious endeavor to enforce the laws. 
Unsurprisingly, the PKI then launched its "unilateral" mass actions to overcome the 
sabotaging of the laws' implementation, and, no less unsurprisingly, this campaign 
failed in the midst of rapidly sharpening tensions in the rural communities. The 
massacres of 1965-66, in which tens of thousands of ordinary rural people came to be 
executioners, cannot be fully explained without reference to the social, economic, and 
psychological consequences of a land reform program put into place under conditions 
of uncontrolled inflation, as well as martial law. "Supposing that" the program had 
been launched under the relatively stable socio-economic conditions of the liberal 
democratic period, would not the outcome have been quite different?
It is necessary also to emphasize very strongly that incessantly using fiery 
"revolutionary" rhetoric unaccompanied by practical, concrete, and well-thought-out 
policies for achieving this rhetoric's stated goals was like revving up a motor car's 
engine to maximum speed without putting it into gear. The engine gets burning hot, but 
the car does not move. Towards the end of Guided Democracy the atmosphere in 
Indonesia was getting more and more heated, while the sedan brand-named Progress, 
let alone the pickup brand-named Revolution, stalled and broke down. This 
spectacularly visible contrast increasingly eroded Bung Kamo's authority. The "pro­
revolution" groups grew more and more frustrated at the lack of concrete progress, 
while for the "antis" the specter of revolution aroused deeper and deeper panic and 
fury. Did Bung Kamo really understand this situation? This is not an easy question to 
answer. But it is equally difficult to avoid the conclusion that if Bung Kamo was a 
great leader in the era of Revolution for Independence, which exploded from below, 
quite outside the calculations of the Nationalist Movement's elite, he absolutely cannot 
be called a Great Leader of (The) Revolution fullstop.
In the too lengthy analysis above, I have tried to understand Bung Kamo as a man 
of his time— a time that has long passed—not to praise him or to condemn him either. 
The Father of the Indonesian Nation is today immune both to praise and blame. He 
was shaped by his birth, by his education, by the history of the Netherlands Indies, 
and the history of the modem world: also by the sweet and bitter experiences of his 
youth. Yet in the end all these factors cannot explain why this HBS and ITB graduate 
made the decision to become a fighter for his country's freedom (at a time when the 
Dutch colonial state seemed so powerful and so permanent) rather than a quiet, 
successful professional architect. After the horrors of the Orde Babibuta,22 it may be 
too easy to say: "Well, at least he was never tortured, his wife was never raped, and 
his children were never socially ostracized as anak haram politik.23 Nor was the 
property he owned ever seized." All this is true enough, but he was spied on, menaced, 
slandered, ridiculed, fried by a sort of colonial Mahmilub,24 and lost his freedom for 
almost ten years. If Japan had not overrun the Netherlands Indies, his internment could
22 Babibuta, literally "blind boar/' means to "rage savagely." This is my riff on Orde Babe, the standard 
slang term for Suharto's Orde Baru.
23 Here I make an oblique allusion to Pramoedya's famous short story "Anak Haram." The term usually 
means "illegitimate child," but Pramoedya used it to refer to the ostracized status of a young boy whose 
father had been a collaborator with the Dutch.
24 An allusion to the kangaroo-court Extraordinary Military Tribunals set up try communists from late 
1965 on.
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have continued for years into his old age. He loved the heterogeneous nation that he 
himself had helped to build. More than anyone else in his generation he had the ability 
to spread national consciousness and the ideals of freedom even to the poorest of the 
poor. Such intimate ties with his people, combined with his other gifts, meant that at 
the time of the Proclamation of Independence in 1945 no other native but he was 
imaginable as the country's first head of state. It's true: he was really loved.
As leader of the movement for national independence he was an outstanding 
success. But it has to be admitted that as state leader in the post-independence era, he 
was a failure in many respects. His Guided Democracy collapsed into smoking ruins, 
and he ended his life once again as a prisoner. In all this he was by no means unique. 
Many other heroes of different independence movements failed as presidents or prime 
ministers in the aftermath of independence: U Nu, Nasser, Sekou Toure, Nkrumah, 
Bandaranaike, Mugabe, Kim II Sung, and Kenneth Kaunda, among others. Sim Yat-sen 
too. And if Gandhi had not been assassinated, but had become Head of State, would 
he have been a success? Not necessarily. Could Ho Chi Mirth have ever imagined that 
thirty-three years after his death, his Vietnam would be listed as World No. 1 or No. 2 
for corruption, which spread like cancer through its body politic? The challenges of the 
post-independence period are very different from those of the heroic period that 
precedes it. And the world also changes constantly at a dizzying speed.
In all this are there any useful lessons to be learned for our own time? Perhaps there 
at least two. The first is the danger of fossilization. If there is some truth in my lengthy 
analysis, the conclusion can be drawn that with respect to Bung Kamo's attitudes and 
thinking the fossilization process began with Bung Kamo himself once Indonesia had 
become independent and he had become president. By stages, of course. And after his 
death, this fossilization has only increased apace, under clouds of incense. Such a 
conclusion does not mean that Bung Kamo's views and values are totally out of date. 
It simply means that his thinking needs to be considered in a critical (not hostile) spirit, 
on the basis of a historical awareness of the distance between his time and our own. 
The Borobudur, the largest and maybe the most beautiful Buddhist stupa in the world, 
is today a source of pride for the Indonesian people. But today's Indonesian society is 
no longer Buddhist. The Buddhism which inspired the creators of the Borobudur more 
than a millennium ago interests almost no one in the Archipelago today. Yet the stupa's 
grandeur, its beauty, and the solemnity that surrounds it still inspire and awe.
Treating the writings of Bung Kamo as a Holy Book (like the Bible or the Koran) or 
as Sacred Ancestral Teachings makes impossible any deep and relevant thinking about 
the problems facing Indonesia today: creating social justice in the era of globalization 
and computerization; developing a healthy federal system in which Bhinneka and Eka 
do not have knives at each others' throats; finding alternatives to the savagery of 
neoliberalism, the octopus-grip of gigantic "transnational" corporations, and the 
nihilism of Hollywood; stopping the destruction of the environment; providing 
protection for minorities; securing human rights, and, still more important, the rights of 
Indonesians as citizens of Indonesia; battling the total rot in the country's legal system; 
and so many more. For most of these problems, no answers will be found in The 
Teachings of Bung Kamo. Times have changed so much, so fast.
To the contrary, fossilization opens the door wide to manipulation and deception. 
Crooked politicians can win mass support by claiming to be "100 percent Faithful to
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Bung Kamo's Teachings/' while actually pursuing policies and programs 100 percent in 
violation of Bung Kamo's principles. Most of the leaders of the PDIP [Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle, headed by Bung Kamo's daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri] 
have accommodated themselves to the neoliberal capitalism insisted upon by the IMF 
and the United States, while quietly tossing into the garbage-bin any conception of 
socialism, including Bung Kamo's Indonesian-style Socialism. These people do not 
have the courage to say frankly "We reject Bung Kamo's socialist principles as both 
mistaken and out of date." The same people fully supported Harto's colonial policy 
towards East Timor, rather than helping the East Timorese in their struggle for 
freedom. This stance did not merely violate the Constitution, which describes in detail 
the country's geographical extent as inherited from the Netherlands Indies; it also 
represented a shameful 100 percent about-turn from one main principle of Bung 
Kamo's nationalism—world-solidarity with all nationalist movements in fighting 
colonialism. Any Sukamoist with a brain in his head can see that in the drama of East 
Timor, the old role of the Dutch colonialists was taken over by the Indonesian 
government, while Bung Kamo's former role was played by Xanana Gusmao. In this 
instance, too, the PDIP leaders were too cowardly to say publicly that "Bung Kamo 
was wrong," let alone give any rational reasons for saying so. Praising The Teachings of 
Bung Kamo to the skies while quietly betraying their most central components 
represents a dishonesty and a hypocrisy that is very ominous for the future.
Second: From Bung Kamo and his time we can disinter the seeds of a vitally 
needed form of nationalism, not as an heirloom inherited from the ancestors, but as a 
political commitment in the present and for the future. It is true that he often spoke 
facilely about 350 years of Dutch colonialism, though he knew perfectly well that at the 
time of his own birth Atjeh, South Bali, and most of South Sulawesi had yet to be 
subjected to imperialist control. It is likely, however, that he used such language to 
make his listeners feel ashamed, and because of this sense of shame, feel prodded into 
action. He knew just as well that even Kartini, dying so young, had no opportunity to 
feel herself an Indonesian woman. Bung Kamo's generation was the first to imagine 
itself as "Indonesian." Thus being Indonesian was (and is) not something "natural" or 
biological, but was (and is) something created by modem history, and demands 
determination, solidarity, a willingness to make sacrifices, and hope. Above all, hope. 
The "Indonesian" imagined by the National Movement was a human being who stood 
up straight, didn't grovel to, and didn't trample on, anyone, and was open-minded, 
dynamic, inclusive, steadfast in adversity, and with sympathy for all mankind. A 
human being of this kind is not a creature who appears in the world "naturally," but 
needs to be trained, day in day out, both by him- or herself, and by his or her fellow 
human beings. This, I think, is the most important of those "lessons" from Bung Kamo 
that are still fresh and relevant for his countrymen. And: an unbreakable optimism, 
even amidst min. Requiescas in Pace, Bung Kamo.

